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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
AcQUIRING JURISDICTION WITHOUT PERSONAL SERVICE, SEIZURE OR AID OF
STATUTZ.-It is often assumed that courts can acquire jurisdiction only by
personal service to give jurisdiction in personam, or by a seizure to give
jurisdiction in ren; but it is not so. The assumption is induced no doubt
by the fact that in the ordinary common law actions jurisdiction is acquired
in that way. Mr. Justice Field very distinctly pointed out in the case of
Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 714, that it was not the fact that the
land was not seized that rendered the judgment void. It was the fact that the
land was not the res in litigation in the prior case that made the judgment
void.
Laying aside the common law actions of writ of error, certiorari, and the
like, in which superior courts always acquired jurisdiction without any per-
sonal service or seizure, as being in their nature rather continuations of prior
actions in other courts, than a grasp of fresh jurisdiction; no such explana-
tion can be made to justify the fact that courts of probate and administration
have from the earliest history of the common law to the present time taken
jurisdiction without either of these supposed requisites. Someone suggests
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to the court that a citizen has died and petitions that his estate be adminis-
tered; whereupon the court immediately takes jurisdiction without any seizure
at all, appoints someone to collect dues and guard the assets till a final hear-
ing can be had, and orders notice published to all persons interested to appear
and defend. No seizure has ever been supposed essential to confer jurisdic-
tion. If the administrator does in fact take possession of certain assets, no
one ever supposed that the court's jurisdiction was confined to the assets so
seized.
Courts of equity never supposed that any seizure was necessary in the
absence of personal service to give them jurisdiction in suits to quiet title,
to foreclose mortgages, and the like; nor was any such seizure ever in fact
made. The land being immovable there was no danger of it being spirited
away before a decree could be awarded, and seizure would be an idle cere-
mony. If a levy on the attached property in the statutory actions of attach-
ment at law has been required by the statute, it has been rather with the
view to make sure that the property would be on hand to answer the judg-
ment that might thereafter be rendered, than because of any notion that a
seizure was necessary to confer jurisdiction.
The statutes of the various states have long sanctioned proceedings in ren
against property in the hands of persons other than the owner without any
seizure of the property or personal notice to the owner, by merely summoning
the person in possession as garnishee; and even in case there is no tangible
property, but a mere indebtedness by the garnishee, a summons to him to
hold the indebtedness and account to the court for it has been declared by
statute to give the court jurisdiction to proceed in rem against the indebted-
ness without obtaining any jurisdiction in personam against the principal
debtor; and the constitutionality of these statutes has been sustained in Harris
v. Balk (I9o5), 198 U. S. 2i5, 25 S. Ct. 625, and numerous other cases.
Courts of chancery have generally refused to entertain suits in the nature
of creditors' bills until the creditor has reduced his claim to judgment at law
and had execution levied or returned nulla bona, not because of any supposed
jurisdictional impediment to entertainment of such suits without personal
service on the debtor or seizure of the property, but because the creditor has
no standing in equity till he has exhausted his remedy at law. PoMtzoY, EQ.
Jun., § 1415.
But if the creditor's claim is not legal but merely equitable, for which
reason he could maintain no action at law, no reason is apparent why a
court of chancery should not take jurisdiction at once to afford him relief
though there is no tangible property that can be seized, and the defendant
cannot be personally served in the jurisdiction, and no statute expressly em-
powers the court to act in such cases. The court would seem to possess this
jurisdiction by reason of its general jurisdiction to grant relief on the claim
involved, or because there is no adequate remedy at law.
In Murray v. Murray (m896), 115 Cal. 2%66, 37 L. R. A. 626, 56 Am. St. 95,
a woman who had been seduced, later married her seducer, and had been
immediately deserted by him, filed a bill for separate maintenance without
prayer for divorce, and prayed that property that he had transferred after the
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seduction but before the marriage to get it out of her reach be appropriated
for that purpose. The husband was not found in the state, did not appear,
and the transferee demurred, contending that she was not such a creditor at
the time of the transfer as could object to the transfer for fraud, and as a
creditor could not maintain a bill before obtaining judgment; but the court
sustained her bill, and said that attachment is not the only means by which
the court may acquire control of the property of the absentee defendant so as
to make it a proceeding in rem; Harrison and Temple, JJ., dissenting.
The assumption of such jurisdiction in the recent case of Kelley v. Baus-
man (Wash., Oct. _-6, 1917), i68 Pac. i8i, seems fully justified on both
reason and authority, though dissented from by Ellis, C. J., and Holcomb,
Main, and Parker, JJ. In this case complainant seeking a decree of separate
maintenance against her husband who was not found within the state, made
persons holding property belonging to him and corporations in which he
held stock, defendants, and prayed for and obtained a preliminary injunction
restraining the defendants from parting with the property, and a final decree
requiring the defendants to turn the property into the registry of the court
for her benefit.
In sustaining a similar decree in a like case appealed from the supreme
court of Ohio, Mr. Justice Brandeis said in Pennington v. Fourth National
Bank (917), 243 U. S. 269, 271, "In.ordinary garnishment proceedings the
obligation enforced is a debt existing at the commencement of the action,
whereas the obligation to pay alimony arises only as a result of the suit.
The distinction is in this connection without legal significance. The power
of the state to proceed against the property of an absent defendant is the
same whether the obligation sought to be enforced is an admitted indebted-
ness or a contested claim. It is the same whether the claim is liquidated or
is unliquidated, like a claim for damages in contract or in tort. It is like-
wise immaterial that the claim is at the commencement of the suit inchoate,
to be perfected only by time or the action of the court."
In another case, also for alimony, against a defendant not found within
the state, the supreme court of Kansas said in Wesner v. O'Brien (1896), 56
Kan. 724, "The essential matter is that the defendant shall have legal notice
of the proposed appropriation, and this is afforded by the publication notice
which warns the defendant that one of the purposes of the proceeding is the
sequestration of the land. It refers interested parties to the petition, in which
the land is definitely described, and wherein it is asked that the land be set
apart as alimony; A formal seizure is no more essential to the jurisdiction
of the court in a proceeding of this kind than in an action to quiet title to
land, based alone on constructive service."
The supreme court of Iowa has gone so far as to hold in a case of this
kind, that a mere prayer for such alimony as the court shall deem equitable,
without any prayer for sequestration of the particular property to that pur-
pose, gave the court jurisdiction to award the alimony out of property which
the complainant had caused to be attached in the proceeding in a mistaken
attempt to adapt the legal action of attachment under the statute to a suit
for divorce to which it did not extend, and although the defendant in the di-
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vorce proceeding was not served within the state and did 
not appear; for
the reason that the fact that the statute did not warrant attachments 
in
divorce proceedings was an irregularity which could not be availed 
of col-
laterally. Twng v. O'Meara (1882), 59 Iowa 326. See also Thurston v.
Thurston (1894), 58 Minn. 279; Wood v. Price (9ii), 79 N. J. Eq. i; Ben-
tier v. Benner (igoo), 63 Ohio St. 22o; Bailey v. Bailey (igoo), 127 N. Car. 474.J. R. R.
